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Abstract 34 
The Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) paradigm has been widely used to investigate the sense of body 35 
ownership.  People who report experiencing the pain of others are hypothesised to have differences 36 
in computing body ownership and, hence, we predicted that they would perform atypically on the 37 
RHI.  The Vicarious Pain Questionnaire (VPQ), was used to divide participants into three groups: 1) 38 
non-responders (people who report no pain when seeing someone else experiencing physical pain), 2) 39 
sensory-localised responders (report sensory qualities and a localised feeling of pain) and 3) affective-40 
general responders (report a generalised and emotional feeling of pain).  The sensory-localised 41 
group, showed susceptibility to the RHI (increased proprioceptive drift) irrespective of whether 42 
stimulation was synchronous or asynchronous, whereas the other groups only showed the RHI in the 43 
synchronous condition.  This is not a general bias to always incorporate the dummy hand as we did 44 
not find increased susceptibility in other conditions (seeing touch without feeling touch, or feeling 45 
touch without seeing touch), but there was a trend for this group to incorporate the dummy hand 46 
when it was stroked with a laser light. Although individual differences in the RHI have been noted 47 
previously, this particular pattern is rare.  It suggests a greater malleability (i.e. insensitivity to 48 
asynchrony) in the conditions in which other bodies influence own-body judgments. 49 
 50 
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Introduction 66 
The rubber hand illusion (RHI) paradigm (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) is an established means of 67 
investigating and manipulating the sense of body-ownership including body location, image, and 68 
agency (Ehrsson, Spence & Passingham,2004; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Longo, Schuur, Hammers, 69 
Tsakiris & Haggard, 2008). In this paradigm, the participant’s hand is hidden from view and a dummy 70 
hand is placed in view, alongside the real hand. The hidden and dummy hands are then stroked 71 
either synchronously or asynchronously. The illusion is significantly stronger in the synchronous 72 
condition, when the participant feels the touch delivered to the visible dummy hand as if the hand 73 
belonged to him/her. Thus, when the illusion occurs, the rubber hand becomes temporarily 74 
incorporated in the participant’s mental body representation.  This is reflected in a perceived shift in 75 
the position of one’s own hand towards the fake hand, a phenomenon termed proprioceptive drift. 76 
The objective measure of proprioceptive drift complements self-reported questionnaire ratings 77 
through which participants report their experience of ownership, self-location, and agency over the 78 
fake hand.  79 
The RHI arises through the integration of multisensory information with reference to a prior mental 80 
body representation (Costantini & Haggard, 2007). According to this model, visual, proprioceptive, 81 
and somatosensory inputs are processed within higher order multimodal integration areas (Ehrsson, 82 
Spence & Passingham,2004; Tsakiris et al., 2007; Limanowski & Blankeburg, 2015).  As such, the 83 
illusion is the strongest when distinct external inputs match each other (as shown by the difference 84 
between synchronous and asynchronous stroking, Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) and also when 85 
external inputs match internal representations of the body (Tsakiris, 2010). The RHI is greater when 86 
the rubber hand looks similar, has same orientation and side as the real hand (e.g. both left or both 87 
right) and when the hand is within the peripersonal space (PPS) of the person (Preston, 2013).  Thus, 88 
the viewed object is tested against an abstract model of one’s body for ‘fit’,  to determine whether 89 
or not the dummy hand is incorporated within the body model in a process that involves both 90 
bottom-up and top-down mechanisms (Tsakiris, Costantini & Haggard, 2008). In some 91 
circumstances, the illusion can also occur in the absence of visuo-tactile congruency. The illusion can 92 
be induced in a ‘light only’ condition, when the dummy hand is ‘stroked’ by a laser-pointer but no 93 
light/tactile stimulation is applied to the real hand (Durgin, Evans, Dunphy, Klostermann & Simmons, 94 
2007). Here, participants who report tactile and thermal sensations evoked by the light-beam also 95 
report stronger feeling of ownership of the dummy hand.  96 
Atypical performance on the RHI has been linked to various psychiatric and developmental 97 
conditions, as well as sub-clinical individual differences.  Differences in the RHI are observed in 98 
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patients with autism (Paton, Hohwy & Enticott, 2012; Palmer, Paton, Hohwy & Enticott, 2013), 99 
schizophrenia (Thakkar et al., 2011), neurotypical variations linked to schizotypy (Germine, Benson, 100 
Cohen & Hooker, 2015; Kallai et al., 2015), in eating disorders including anorexia nervosa (Eshkevari, 101 
Rieger, Longo, Haggard & Treasure, 2012; Kaplan, Enticott, Hohwy, Castle & Rossell, 2014), and in 102 
mirror-touch synaesthesia (Aimola Davies & White, 2013).  In the latter, participants report 103 
experiencing touch when seeing others touched and, during the RHI paradigm, report ownership of 104 
the rubber hand when it is stroked but no physical touch is applied to the participant’s own hand.  105 
This may occur because the observed touch triggers a synchronised feeling of touch on their own 106 
body, analogous to the normal effect of synchrony in the RHI (Aimola Davies & White, 2013).  107 
However, it may also reflect more general differences in computing body ownership in this group: in 108 
effect, a tendency to misattribute other people’s bodies as their own (Ward & Banissy, 2015).  In the 109 
present study, we extend this to a similar are related phenomenon to mirror-touch synaesthesia  110 
(Ward, Schnakenberg & Banissy, in press), namely to  individuals who report feeling pain when 111 
seeing pain in others.   112 
Seeing someone else in pain activates neural circuitry involved in the physical perception of pain 113 
(Jackson, Brunet, Meltzoff & Decety, 2006; Lamm, Decety & Singer, 2011). However, for a subset of 114 
the general population this extends to reportable pain-like experiences evoked by observing others 115 
in pain (Fitzgibbon, Giumarra, Georgiou-Karistianis, Enticott, & Bradshaw, 2010; Fitzgibbon et al., 116 
2012; Osborn & Debyshire, 2010).  These individuals have been called vicarious pain responders, or 117 
mirror-pain synaesthetes.  Ward and Banissy (2015), in their account of mirror-touch/pain 118 
synaesthesia, suggest that this may reflect an over-inclusive body ownership mechanism, in which all 119 
observed bodies are matched to the person’s own internal body model, or as a failure in a top-down 120 
orienting mechanism for selective attention to the self that inhibits representations of the (non-self) 121 
other.  Whatever the precise mechanism, the prediction is that a greater tendency to treat all 122 
observed bodies as self-related will result in an increased tendency to experience the RHI, as well as 123 
the tendency to report experiences on their own body as a result of observing these on other people 124 
(the defining feature of mirror touch/pain).  125 
One study already tested the performance of vicarious pain responders on the RHI using only 126 
subjective reports (not proprioceptive drift). Derbyshire et al. (2013) showed a greater tendency to 127 
incorporate the rubber hand in the pain-responder group when compared to controls and this effect 128 
was unusually apparent for the asynchronous stroking condition (which tends not to induce the 129 
illusion in controls).  We extend this to include five different manipulations of the RHI, including 130 
conditions in which the dummy hand is observed without any physical touch, and grouping 131 
participants via a new assessment tool for vicarious pain experience (Grice-Jackson, Critchley, 132 
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Banissy & Ward, 2017a). The Vicarious Pain Questionnaire (VPQ) employs 16 movie clips depicting 133 
people experiencing physical pain, and probes the phenomenological characteristics of any felt pain 134 
sensations provoked in the observer (e.g. pain quality, pain intensity, pain localisation).  Using a 135 
bottom-up approach of cluster analysis, three groups are identified: 1) non-responders or controls 136 
(who report no pain when watching a video with someone else experiencing physical pain), 2) 137 
sensory-localised responders (S/L) (who report a precisely localised feeling of pain at the same 138 
location as the person in the video) and 3) affective-general responders (A/G) (who report a 139 
generalised and emotional feeling of pain). The validity of these groupings is endorsed by observed 140 
difference in structural and functional brain characteristics (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a, 2017b) and, 141 
in the present study, we demonstrate cognitive differences between the groups and provide the first 142 
assessment of test-retest reliability of the VPQ. 143 
 Using the VPQ to group and recruit participants, we tested both subjective and objective measures 144 
of the rubber hand illusion, with five different manipulation.  Two of these manipulations were the 145 
standard synchronous and asynchronous conditions.  Based on published findings (Derbyshire et al. 146 
2013), we predicted that individuals within the responder groups to be less sensitive to synchrony 147 
(i.e. they will show the illusion in both conditions).  We had no predictions about whether this effect 148 
would be found for one or both responder groups.  Two further manipulations involved the visual 149 
presentation of touch from a paintbrush or light from a laser pointer in the absence of any physical 150 
sensation.  Here, our prediction was that the sensory-localised group (who feel sensations in the 151 
same location that they observe them on others) would show the RHI illusion, as found for mirror-152 
touch synaesthesia (Aimola Davies & White, 2013).  The fifth condition involved the reverse scenario 153 
of feeling touch while observing an untouched dummy hand.  We were not aware of any previous 154 
report of this manipulation inducing the RHI, hence, this serves as an important control measure 155 
across all groups to assess for a general bias in responding. 156 
 157 
Materials and methods 158 
Participants 159 
Ninety-eight volunteers from the University of Sussex took part in the experiment (70 Females; 28 160 
Males; Aged 18-34 yrs; Mean = 21.75 ± 3.11 SD).  Each participant completed the Vicarious Pain 161 
Questionnaire (VPQ) and were divided into three groups based on the 2-step cluster analysis 162 
performed on the VPQ (see section 2.2 for further description). The groups were: 57 non-responders 163 
(29 F; 18 M; Aged 18-34 yrs; M = 21.88 ± 3.45 SD), 22 sensory-localised responders (S/L) (17 F; 5 M; 164 
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Aged 18-25 yrs; M = 21.6 ± 2.15 SD), and 19 affective-general responders (A/G) (14 F; 5 M; Aged 19 – 165 
33 yrs; M = 21.53 ± 3.1 SD).  166 
Since its development, a total sample of N=1056 individuals (Aged 18-60 yrs, M= 20.42 ± 4.16 SD, 167 
297 Males, 759 Females) have completed the VPQ including data from N=573 reported by Grice-168 
Jackson et al., (2017a).  The larger sample also included 82 participants (Aged: 18-33 yrs, M = 20.23 ± 169 
3.31 SD, 68 Females, 14 males) who had taken the measure twice, at least one academic year apart.  170 
We used this dataset to undertake an analysis of test-retest reliability of the VPQ and to determine 171 
how the group structure is affected by different parameters entered into the clustering model. 172 
Cluster analysis is an exploratory analysis that requires large data sets (Landwehr & Zupan, 1987) 173 
and so was run on the entire sample, and not just the experimental subsample.  174 
Vicarious Pain Questionnaire 175 
Description. The Vicarious Pain Questionnaire (VPQ; developed by Grice-Jackson and 176 
colleagues, 2017a) was run using Bristol Online Survey.   177 
The questionnaire comprises 16 videos (no audio) of people experiencing physical pain (e.g. 178 
falls, sports injuries, injections), each video lasting for approximately 10 seconds.  179 
After each video, participants were questioned about their experience. First, participants were asked 180 
if they experienced a bodily sensation of pain while viewing the video (yes/no). If the answer was 181 
“yes”’, participants were asked to describe their pain by answering three more questions about their 182 
experience: 1) how intense their pain experience was (1-10 Likert scale, 1= very mild pain, 10 = 183 
highly intense pain); 2) if and where they localised the pain, answering options were either “localised 184 
to the same point as the observed pain in the video”, “localised but not to the same point”, and “a 185 
general/non-localisable experience of pain”; 3) to select pain adjectives from a list that best 186 
described their vicarious pain experience (10 sensory descriptors such as “tingling”, “burning”, 187 
“stinging”, 10 affective descriptors such as “nauseating”, “gruelling”, “aversive” and 3 cognitive-188 
evaluative descriptors “brief”, “rhythmic”, “constant”). From these answers, a Localised – 189 
Generalised score was computed from the total of “localised to the same point” and “localised to a 190 
different point” minus the total number of non-localisable (generalised) experiences.  A Sensory – 191 
Affective score was computed from the total number of sensory adjectives minus the total number 192 
of affective adjectives. 193 
Subsequently all participants (regardless of their affirmative or negative answer to the first 194 
question) were asked to rate how unpleasant their experience was (1-10 Likert scale, 1= not at all 195 
unpleasant, 10=highly unpleasant). The final section of the VPQ asked participants if they had 196 
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previously experienced vicarious pain in their daily life and how regular that happened (10 point 197 
Likert Scale, -5 = hardly ever, 5 = very regularly). 198 
Two-Step Cluster Analysis. The two-step cluster analysis comprised an initial hierarchical cluster 199 
analysis using Ward’s Method (Ward, 1963) and a second k-means cluster analysis. The cluster 200 
centroids and number of clusters for the k-means analysis were provided by the hierarchical cluster 201 
analysis.  We repeated an earlier clustering approach (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a) based on three 202 
input variables (total number of pain responses, localised-generalised score, sensory-affective 203 
score).  This analysis was contrasted against two similar models in which total pain responses was 204 
substituted for the conceptually related variables of mean intensity of pain responses, or the 205 
regularity of pain responses (in daily life).  206 
 207 
Rubber Hand Illusion Questionnaire  208 
The RHI questionnaire contained 10 items divided into three subscales: ownership, location, 209 
and agency (Longo et al., 2007), see Table 1 for further details.  The items were measured on a 7-210 
point Likert scale (1 = strongly, 7 = strongly agree). Four extra questions were added for the light 211 
condition, in order to record any tactile or thermal sensations induced by the laser beam (see table 1 212 
for detailed description of the items). These last four questions were added at a later stage and 213 
therefore data was gathered only from a subset of participants (N=39).  214 
  215 
Table 1. RHI questionnaire items and subscales.  216 
Subscale Items 
Ownership It seemed like… 
 1. …I was looking directly at my own hand, rather than at a rubber hand. 
 2. …the rubber hand began to resemble my real hand. 
 3. …the rubber hand belonged to me.  
 4. …the rubber hand was my hand.  
 5. …the rubber hand was part of my body. 
Location 6. …my hand was in the location where the rubber hand was. 
 7. …the rubber hand was in the location where my hand was. 
 8. …the sensation I felt was caused by the paintbrush touching (or laser pointer 
playing on) the rubber hand.  
Agency 9. …I could have moved the rubber hand if I had wanted. 
 10. …I was in control of the rubber hand. 
Light induced sensations 11. …I felt a tactile sensation in my hand. 
 12. …I felt a thermal sensation in my hand. 
 13. …the sensation was cold. 
 14. …the sensation was warm.  
 217 
 218 
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Experimental procedure  219 
In the RHI task, the participant was seated at a table, opposite to the experimenter with his/her right 220 
arm placed in a box (86cm x 60cm x 20cm). The participants were asked to rest her/his hand in the 221 
most comfortable position with the palm facing down and slightly arched. A life-size model of a right 222 
hand was placed in the box, directly in front of participant body midline. The participant could only 223 
see the dummy hand through a squared hole on top of the box, but could not see her/his own right 224 
hand which was occluded by the box cover from the top and by a piece of black fabric from the right-225 
hand side. The distance between participant’s right index finger and the index finger of the fake 226 
hand was 20cm.  227 
Five conditions were performed in a counterbalanced order across participants: Synchronous (the 228 
timing of the brush strokes on the rubber hand and participant’s own hand was synchronized); 229 
asynchronous (the timing of the brush strokes was out of phase by approximately 625ms); light (a 230 
laser beam was playing on the index finger of the rubber hand); see-touch (the brush stimulation 231 
was applied only to the rubber hand) and; feel-touch (the brush stimulation was applied only to 232 
participant’s real hand). At the beginning of each condition, a cover was placed on top of the box 233 
and the participant was asked to estimate the location of her/his right index finger tip by reading the 234 
corresponding number along a one-meter ruler laid across the setting top, parallel to the frontal 235 
plane. The reading was repeated three times before each trial and the placement of the ruler varied 236 
each time to prevent the participant repeating responses in subsequent readings. These 237 
measurements were followed by 120s stimulation ‘induction’ at approximately 1.6Hz (75 times in 238 
120s) for all conditions. The paintbrush stimulation was applied from the knuckle to the finger nail, 239 
while that of the laser pointer was back and forth from the knuckle to the finger nail as it was not 240 
easy to switch off/on and maintain timing. Following this, post-induction finger location judgements 241 
were obtained in the same manner as prior to the induction and the participant filled out the RHI 242 
questionnaire after each condition. The average of the three measurements taken before and after 243 
each trial was calculated. Proprioceptive drift was calculated by subtracting the pre-induction finger 244 
location judgement from the post-induction finger location judgement: 245 
 246 
PD = mean(post-induction judgements) – mean(pre-induction judgements) 247 
 248 
Data Analysis 249 
The statistical software used was SPSS version 23 (SPSS Inc., USA). The significance level for all 250 
analyses was set at p<0.05 and the results reported are two-tailed. 251 
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Analyses were performed to test the effects of two independent variables (groups and stimulus 252 
type) on two dependent variables (proprioceptive drift and RHI questionnaire subjective ratings). 3 253 
(group) x 2 (stimulation mode) mixed model ANOVAs were used to analyse the data of 254 
proprioceptive drift and each of the RHI questionnaire subscale for the synchronous and 255 
asynchronous conditions. For the proprioceptive drift data, outliers were excluded for each 256 
condition using SPSS based on the 3-interquartile range (IQR). Thus, one outlier was excluded from 257 
the asynchronous condition, four from the light condition and one from the see-touch condition. No 258 
outliers were found in the questionnaire data outside the 3-IQR. Subsequent post-hoc tests adjusted 259 
for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni corrections) assessed differences between and within groups. 260 
One-way ANOVAs were used for each of the other three conditions to test group effects on 261 
proprioceptive drift. For the questionnaire data, non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests were used 262 
for each subscale.  263 
Results 264 
Reliability of the VPQ 265 
For the 82 participants who completed this measure on two occasions, the test-retest scores were 266 
all significantly correlated between time 1 and time 2 as shown by Spearman’s correlations for the 267 
various measures: total pain responses (rho= 0.629, p<0.001); mean pain intensity (rho= 0.640, 268 
p<0.001); reported levels of vicarious pain outside of experiment (rho= 0.349, p=0.001); localised-269 
general score (rho= 0.295, p<0.001); and sensory-affective score (rho= 0.550, p=0.007).   Correlation 270 
coefficients are a measure of effect size and, by convention, values >.5 are considered large, and 271 
those >.3 are considered medium.  The most reliable individual difference measures in psychology, 272 
refined over decades of research, tend to have correlations around .7 or .8 (Vul, Harris, Winkielman, 273 
& Pashler, 2009).  Considering the different ways of clustering the data, the inclusion of mean pain 274 
intensity led to the most consistent clustering (χ 2 = 48.512, p<0.001; Cramer’s V = 0.544, p<0.001), 275 
followed by reported levels of real-world vicarious pain (χ 2 = 47.947, p<0.001; Cramer’s V = 0.541, 276 
p<0.001), and total number of pain responses (χ 2 = 37.817, p<0.001; Cramer’s V = 0.480, p<0.001).   277 
Cramer’s V is a measure of effect size where V>.5 is considered large.  As such, we conclude that the 278 
VPQ measure is reliable over time and the reliability is enhanced by adding mean intensity rather 279 
than total number of pain responses (as used in Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a, 2017b), although it is to 280 
be noted that both methods are adequate and yield only minor differences in the clustering across 281 
the whole data set (presented in supplementary results S1). 282 
Proprioceptive drift 283 
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Means and standard deviations of proprioceptive drift for each condition and in each group are 284 
shown in Table 1.   285 
 286 
 287 
Table 1. Mean proprioceptive drift (mm) and standard deviations for each condition in each group  288 
Group   Conditions   
 Synchronous Asynchronous      Light See-touch Feel-touch 
      
Controls 15.96 ± 23.38 3.04 ± 18.54 2.01 ± 11.50 1.07 ± 14.40 - 2.98 ± 14.40 
S/L 21.36 ± 22.72 17.30 ± 18.46 17.42 ± 29.13 7.83 ± 24.35 -1.27 ± 17.33 
A/G  23.51 ± 19.78 -5.88 ± 22.51 3.77 ± 19.15 10.96 ± 27.08 -1.12 ± 18.41 
 289 
Considering first the effect of synchrony/asynchrony, the 2 x 3 ANOVA used for synchronous and 290 
asynchronous conditions showed significant main effects of stimulus type, F (1,189) = 20.808, 291 
p<0.001, η2 = 0.039 and group, F (2, 189) = 3.800, p<0.05, η2 = 0.099 on proprioceptive drift. There 292 
was also a statistically significant interaction between the effects of group and stimulus type, F 293 
(2,189) = 3.774, p<0.05, η2 = 0.038, indicating that synchronous and asynchronous stimulations 294 
evoked different group effects. Post-hoc tests using Bonferroni corrections revealed that 295 
proprioceptive drift was significantly higher in S/L (19.332 ± 3.21) than in controls (9.503 ± 1.971), 296 
p<0.05.  Significantly greater proprioceptive drift was found in the asynchronous condition in the S/L 297 
group when compared to controls, t(76)=-3.017, p<0.005, and to A/G, t(38)=3.540, p=0.001. No 298 
significant differences were found in the synchronous condition. Differences between synchronous 299 
and asynchronous conditions were assessed within the three groups. Proprioceptive drift was 300 
significantly greater in the synchronous than in the asynchronous conditions in controls, t (56) = 301 
4.520, p <0.001, and in A/G group, t(18) = 4.723, p<0.001. However, there was no significant 302 
difference in proprioceptive drift in the S/L group, t(21) = 0.848, p =0.407. Figure 1 shows all these 303 
results.  In short, the S/L responder group shows a disruption of body ownership insofar as they have 304 
a greater tendency to incorporate asynchronous touch to the dummy hand into their body schema. 305 
The other three conditions were analysed using one-way ANOVAs, as the focus was on differences in 306 
between groups, rather than direct comparisons of the conditions. No significant differences were 307 
found for see-touch, F(2,94) = 2.153, p=0.122 and feel-touch, F (2,95) = 1.231, p=0.297 conditions 308 
between the groups. This is important because it suggests that there isn’t a general tendency to 309 
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incorporate the rubber hand (or a general response bias) but, rather, a specific tendency to do so 310 
under some conditions.  There was a significant difference in the light condition, F (2,92)= 5.601, 311 
p=0.005 (results are shown in Figure 2). However, this data failed Levene’s test for equality of 312 
variances and the post hoc Games-Howell test comparing S/L group with controls showed only a 313 
trend, p=0.061. Further exploratory analyses for the light condition can be seen in the 314 
supplementary results S2.  315 
 316 
Figure 1 Mean PD (mm) of the three groups for Synchronous and Asynchronous conditions. Error bars indicate one 317 
standard error. S/L = sensory-localised; A/G = affective-general. The sensory-localised group (S/L) reported significantly 318 
higher proprioceptive drift than both controls and affective-general group (A/G) in the asynchronous condition.  319 
 320 
Figure 2 Mean PD (mm) of the three groups for the Light condition. Error bars indicate one standard error. S/L = sensory-321 
localised; A/G = affective-general. The sensory-localised group (S/L)  showed a trend towards higher proprioceptive drift in 322 
the light condition than both controls and affective- general group (A/G).  323 
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The results obtained for proprioceptive drift showed higher susceptibility for the illusion in the 324 
asynchronous condition in the S/L group which scored higher than the controls and a similar trend 325 
was observed in the light condition.  326 
Subjective ratings 327 
Since almost half of the conditions failed Shapiro-Wilk normality test, each of the three subscales of 328 
the RHI questionnaire: ownership, location, and agency were analysed using Mann-Whitney U non-329 
parametric test.  In the synchronous condition, the S/L group scored higher than controls on the 330 
ownership scale (U=423.5, p=0.026), on location (U=421.5, p=0.024) and on agency (U=449.0, 331 
p=0.05). In the asynchronous condition, they scored higher than controls on ownership (U= 103.0, 332 
p=0.03) and on agency (U=126.5, p=0.044) and A/G also on the ownership (U=103, p=0.006) and 333 
agency (U=126, p=0.027). They also scored higher than controls in the light condition on the 334 
ownership (U=423.5, p=0.026) and location (U=422.0, p=0.025) subscales.  In summary, the 335 
questionnaire results show a similar pattern to the proprioceptive drift scores: the S/L responder 336 
group shows a greater tendency to incorporate the dummy hand on the asynchronous trials.  In 337 
addition, there was a greater tendency for them to report the RHI on the standard, synchronous, 338 
condition. 339 
A subset of participants (N=39) were asked about tactile/thermal sensations from the laser light 340 
stimulation.  Of these participants, 60% agreed to experiencing a sensation on one or more 341 
questions, and these did not significantly differ across groups (group percentages: Controls=52%; 342 
S/L= 82%, A/G=44%; χ 2 = 3.521, p=0.172;).  Participants who experienced sensations from the laser 343 
light reported higher Ownership, Location and Agency scores in the RHI in this condition (see 344 
Supplementary Results S2), thus replicating Durgin et al., 2007.    345 
 346 
 347 
 348 
 349 
 350 
 351 
 352 
Figure 3 Mean subjective ratings for ownership, location, and agency in the three groups and for synchronous and 353 
asynchronous conditions. Error bars indicate standard errors. S/L = sensory-localised; A/G = affective-general. The sensory-354 
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localised group (S/L) indicated higher ratings for ownership and agency than controls and affective-general group (A/G), 355 
and higher ratings for location than controls.  356 
 357 
 358 
 359 
  360 
 361 
 362 
 363 
 364 
 365 
Figure 4 Mean subjective ratings for ownership, location, and agency in the three groups and for light, see-touch and feel-366 
touch conditions. Error bars indicate standard errors. S/L = sensory-localised; A/G = affective-general. The sensory-localised 367 
group reported higher ratings for ownership and location than controls in the light condition.  368 
  369 
Discussion  370 
Previous research has suggested an atypical propensity to experience the rubber hand illusion, a 371 
putative measure of body ownership, in people who report experiencing the pain of others 372 
(Derbyshire et al., 2013) or who report experiencing touch when seeing others touched (Aimola 373 
Davies & White, 2010).  However, the mechanism behind this is not clear: is it visual capture, or an 374 
exaggeration of the normal pattern, or something else?  Here we used a novel way of identifying and 375 
grouping vicarious pain responders (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a), that divides them into two groups: 376 
a sensory/localised (S/L) group who reports localised experiences with sensory qualities on their own 377 
body when viewing pain and an affective/general (A/G) group who reports non-localised experiences  378 
with affective qualities.    We show that the S/L group has a distinctive pattern on the RHI, whereas 379 
the A/G resembles controls.    The S/L group show the RHI for both synchronous and asynchronous 380 
stroking (in terms of higher proprioceptive drift and subjective ratings of ownership and agency).  381 
Moreover, there was a trend towards higher proprioceptive drift in the light condition, and they also 382 
reported greater subjective ratings in the synchronous condition. None of the groups experienced 383 
the illusion when the RHI was broken down into its constituent parts (seeing the dummy touched, 384 
the ‘see-touch’ condition; or feeling one’s own hand touched, the ‘feel-touch’ condition).  This 385 
demonstrates that there is not a general tendency towards incorporating the rubber hand per se, 386 
nor a general tendency for the RHI to be driven by the sight of touch (as suggested previously for 387 
mirror-touch synaesthesia). Together, these results provide evidence that the S/L group have a 388 
heightened tendency to incorporate the rubber hand within their own body representation under 389 
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certain conditions.  The question as to why it is found for the S/L group alone remains to be 390 
determined.  Of relevance here is that the S/L group, but not the A/G group, report that their 391 
experiences are localised to the corresponding body part at least when reporting vicarious pain (and 392 
this is supported by more somatotopic activity in primary somatosensory cortex in the S/L group; 393 
Grice-Jackson et al., 2017b).  Either difficulties in body ownership are limited to the S/L group or, 394 
else, difficulties in body ownership are common to both but operate on different levels (whole 395 
bodies, v. body parts) and generate different effects depending on the nature of the paradigm (e.g. 396 
rubber hand illusion v. whole body illusion; Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007). 397 
In the sections below we discuss the results in detail.  Firstly, in relation to previously reported 398 
individual differences and group-based differences in the RHI.  Secondly, we discuss our findings in 399 
relation to theoretical models of the RHI.   400 
  401 
Previous atypical findings in the RHI 402 
Previous literature has documented atypical RHI susceptibility patterns in clinical conditions 403 
including eating disorders, schizophrenia, and autism and our results will be discussed considering 404 
similarities or dissimilarities with these conditions. 405 
Our results resemble findings that have been previously reported in the eating disorder literature. 406 
Patients with diagnosis of body dysmorphic disorder present no differences in proprioceptive drift 407 
between the synchronous and asynchronous conditions, scoring significantly higher in both 408 
conditions than in the recorded baseline (Kaplan, Enticott, Hohwy, Castle & Rossell, 2014). Eshkevari, 409 
et al. (2012)found that patients with anorexia nervosa score higher on both proprioceptive drift and 410 
on overall subjective ratings when compared to controls () and Zopf, Contini, Fowler, Mondraty and 411 
Williams (2016) reported higher subjective ratings in anorexia nervosa  for both synchronous and 412 
asynchronous RHI conditions when compared to controls, although they didn’t find it in 413 
proprioceptive drift . The pattern of results in our group is similar to these findings which may be 414 
due to abnormalities in self representations.  415 
Eating disorders have been associated with a more unstable bodily self-representation and 416 
increased bodily plasticity (Eshkevari, wt al., 2012; Kaplan, et al., 2014) as well as interoceptive 417 
deficits (Preyde, Watson, Remers & Stuart, 2016, but also see Eshkevari, Rieger, Musiat & 418 
Treasure, 2014).  Lower interoceptive awareness is associated with increased susceptibility to 419 
RHI and with a less clear perception of internal bodily processes that give rise to the bodily self 420 
(Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jimenez & Costantini, 2011) and dysfunctionalities within the insular cortex  421 
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have been linked to distorted body-perceptions (Heydrich & Blanke, 2013) and to eating 422 
disorder (Strigo et al, 2013).  Comparatively little is known about these mechanisms in vicarious 423 
pain responders, although the insula is also implicated.  Grice-Jackson et al. (2017a) reported 424 
increased grey matter density in the insula in both S/L and A/G responders and, using fMRI 425 
functional connectivity, found greater coupling of the insula with the right tempero-parietal 426 
junction (a region implicated in selectively attending to self v. other) in the S/L group when 427 
viewing the pain of others (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017b).  Insula dysfunction could therefore 428 
explain the tendency for the S/L group to have a greater RHI (found in several conditions for 429 
subjective ratings), although it does not make specific predictions about the asynchronous 430 
condition.  It does, however, make the testable prediction that eating disorders and these 431 
differences in vicarious pain perception may co-occur more than chance if they share similar 432 
neurocognitive mechanisms.   433 
The heightened tendency towards experiencing the rubber hand has also been associated with 434 
more pronounced psychotic traits, but, this manifests itself as an exaggeration of the normal 435 
(synchronous) effect (Germine, Benson, Cohen & Hooker, 2015; Kallai et al., 2015). In one 436 
study, schizophrenic patients scored higher on ownership questions of the RHI questionnaire 437 
and presented greater proprioceptive drift after the synchronous condition (Thakkar et al., 438 
2011). Overall, psychotic traits seem to be associated with more pronounced subjective 439 
feelings of ownership, but only after the synchronous condition of the rubber hand illusion and 440 
these results are not convincingly replicated for proprioceptive drift. Compared to this group, 441 
our S/L subjects present some similarities (i.e. higher subjective ratings of ownership than 442 
controls in synchronous condition) but differ insofar as this extends to the asynchronous 443 
condition.  444 
Conversely, lower susceptibility towards the RHI (in the standard synchronous condition) has been 445 
found in people with Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASC) or high autistic traits in non-clinical groups. 446 
This is expressed in measures of proprioceptive drift (Palmer, Paton, Hohwy & Enticott, 2013) and in 447 
reported experience of ownership, when there is no discrepancy between the felt and seen location 448 
(Paton, Hohwy & Enticott, 2012).  In terms of theoretical models, it is possible that people with 449 
autism rely more on sensory input (from their own hand) and less on a top-down internal model of 450 
the body but in psychosis the reverse is true (Quattrocki & Friston, 2014).  A reverse mechanism may 451 
be present in the S/L group and we will discuss possible explanations for this below.  452 
Theoretical models explaining the RHI 453 
Three models explaining the occurrence of the illusion have been proposed until now that would 454 
explain the illusion so we will further interpret our results within these theoretical models.  455 
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The first, classical model proposes that the RHI is enhanced by synchrony or, more generally, by 456 
matching sensory signals (tactile, visual, and proprioceptive). The Botvinik and Cohen (1998) model 457 
suggests that the visuo-tactile correlation alone is responsible for updating the spatial location of 458 
subject’s real hand and that intermodal matching is a sufficient condition for the rubber hand 459 
attribution.  This model has been expanded arguing that the visuo-tactile correlation is necessary but 460 
not always sufficient. It has been proposed that not only the matching of external stimuli is 461 
important but also the matching between the external input and the pre-existing body image (e.g. 462 
body shape/size) or body-schema (e.g. body configuration) (Makin, Holmes & Ehrsson, 2008; 463 
Tsakiris, 2010). Even though the visual-tactile synchrony is the main driver of the illusion, the 464 
coherence with pre-existing visual and proprioceptive body representations is necessary for the 465 
illusion to manifest. Thus, there is a necessity of congruent posture and identity with respect to the 466 
participant’s hand (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; but also see Holle et al., 2011) which facilitates the 467 
integration of sensory information in favour of vision within the peripersonal space (Makin, Holmes 468 
& Ehrsson, 2008).  In our study, we did observe that the illusion occurred when there was a match 469 
between visual and tactile input (synchronous condition) in all groups, however the S/L group 470 
performed similarly in the asynchronous condition too. Within this model, we would conclude that 471 
the S/L interprets asynchrony as a matching signal.  This could be because they do not perceive the 472 
visuo-tactile asynchrony (a very unlikely scenario since the temporal difference was of approximately 473 
625ms) or, more likely, that the asynchrony is perceived but does not influence the computation of 474 
body ownership in the normal way.  For instance it is to be noted that both the visual and tactile 475 
signals are equally correlated in both the synchronous and asynchronous conditions.  Whereas they 476 
are in-phase in the synchronous condition (occur simultaneously) they are out of phase (occur 477 
consecutively) in the asynchronous condition (i.e. correlations of +1 and -1 respectively).  In our ‘see 478 
touch’ condition the dummy hand was touched and in our ‘feel touch’ condition the real hand was 479 
touched; i.e. there was never a correlation between them.   It may be that the S/L group are 480 
sensitive to visuo-tactile correlations, whereas the more typical pattern is to rely also on visuo-tactile 481 
simultaneity.  This generates a testable prediction that asynchronous stroking in which the strokes 482 
occurs unpredictably (i.e. with zero correlation) would not lead to the RHI in the S/L group. 483 
A second model that has been proposed by Rhode, Luca and Ernst (2011) states that the RHI is 484 
disrupted by asynchrony rather than enhanced by synchrony or matching signals. Their study found 485 
that visual capture alone (i.e. looking at the dummy hand with no touch to either hand) produced 486 
comparable proprioceptive drift to the synchronous condition.  The authors proposed that 487 
proprioceptive drift is typically found when looking at an anatomically plausible dummy hand and 488 
that the asynchronous control condition has a negative effect on the visual capture of 489 
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proprioception as opposed to the synchronous condition having a positive effect on visual-490 
proprioceptive integration. Within this model’s framework, our result shows that asynchronous 491 
stroking does not weaken the visual-proprioceptive integration in the S/L group suggesting that this 492 
group is not treating the visuo-tactile signals as mismatching.  The main condition that adjudicates 493 
between this model and the previous one is whether there is drift in the absence of any touch to 494 
either hand.  Our study did not include this condition and it is important for future research to 495 
explore this with these groups and in terms of other individual differences.   496 
A third theoretical model, the predictive coding or Bayesian framework, proposes that the rubber 497 
hand illusion can be construed as the interpretation that different sensory signals (tactile, visual, 498 
proprioceptive) have a common cause, i.e. that the signals are attributed to a single hand rather 499 
than two different causes namely a dummy and a real hand (see Samad, Chung and Shams, 2014).  500 
The attribution of a common cause depends on two things: the nature of the incoming sensory 501 
signals (e.g. how well they are matched) and prior expectations (e.g. how long it takes for an 502 
observed touch to be felt).    With regards to the sensory signals, those that are spatially and 503 
temporally aligned are more likely to be integrated (i.e. attributed to a common cause) – as in the 504 
original Botvinick and Cohen (1998) explanation and other models in that tradition.  However, there 505 
is an additional property of the sensory signal that is relevant namely it’s precision.  More precise 506 
sensory signals are weighted more heavily, so vision with its high spatial precision tends to dominate 507 
over proprioception and, hence, the illusion as measured by proprioceptive drift can occur just by 508 
looking at the rubber hand (Rohde, et al. 2011; Samad, et al., 2014).  This may also be a source of 509 
individual differences: if an individual has poor proprioception abilities then they should show a 510 
stronger influence of vision and a greater RHI.  This is a testable prediction that could account for 511 
some of the reported differences including those we observe for the S/L group (note: previous 512 
studies on the RHI measure proprioceptive drift rather than actual proprioceptive ability).  The 513 
alternative, not yet considered in detail by these models, is that there are individual and group 514 
differences in priors (i.e. willingness to attribute different signals to a common cause, or to update 515 
priors on the basis of new evidence).  These kinds of differences have been postulated in conditions 516 
such as autism (Van de Cruys et al., 2014) and schizophrenia (Fletcher & Frith, 2009) that also show 517 
differences in RHI susceptibility, and may also be the case in those who report experiencing the 518 
localised pain of others.   519 
 520 
Conclusion 521 
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We have identified a new group of individuals who are highly susceptible to the rubber hand illusion. 522 
Our findings indicate particularities in body representations and self-other distinctions. The S/L 523 
group scored higher under certain conditions on both proprioceptive drift, a measure attributed to 524 
body perception and localization. Moreover, the S/L group scored higher on subjective ratings of the 525 
illusion. Even though the exact mechanisms are still unknown, there are various possible 526 
interpretations. These are not mutually exclusive and include: more unstable body image and body 527 
schema, predominant influence of visual input and lower tactile precision. Further research is 528 
needed to disentangle these aspects.   529 
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 758 
Supplementary Results 759 
S1. VPQ group differences comparing TPRs with intensity 760 
Table 2. Number of subjects in each group for test and post-test generated with TPR or Intensity as 761 
cluster analysis variables. 762 
Group                 Time 1  Time 2       Entire Sample 
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       TPR Intensity      TPR Intensity TPR               Intensity 
      
Controls 49 49 51 55 730                     773 
S/L 21 21 18 17 191                     158 
A/G  12 12 13 10 135                     125 
 763 
Overall, 2 subjects changed group at time 1 when comparing TPR with Intensity representing 2.44% 764 
of the sample (N=82) and 4 subjects changed group at time 2 representing 4.88%. 765 
At the entire sample level (N=1056), 48 subjects changed group, representing 4.5%. 766 
S2. Baseline comparisons and Light question analysis 767 
Further one sample t-tests were conducted for a comparison to a baseline of ‘0’ for all groups and all 768 
conditions. Significant results were obtained in controls for synchronous condition, t(53) = 4.632, 769 
p<0.001; in S/L for synchronous, t(20)=4.112, p=0.001, asynchronous t(20) = 4.295, p<0.001 and light 770 
t(20) = 2.528, p=0.02; in A/G for synchronous t(18) = 5.18, p<0.001. 771 
Table 3. Means and standard deviations for light subjective ratings according to the presence of light 772 
induced sensation 773 
Light Subscale Sensations present Sensations Absent 
   
Ownership 3.7 ± 1.42 2.31 ± 1.27 
Location 4.00 ± 1.46 2.20 ± 1.21 
Agency  3.23 ± 1.46 1.71 ± 0.94 
 774 
Independent Sample t-tests showed that there was a significant difference in subjective ratings of 775 
illusion strength in the light condition between those who did report light-induced sensations and 776 
those who did not. Higher subjective ratings were found for light ownership t(39) = 3.229, p<0.05; 777 
light location t(39)=4.162, p<0.001; light agency t(39)=3.780, p<0.001. Non-parametric Mann-778 
Whitney U test confirmed these results.  779 
S3. Percentages of people not experiencing the illusion in each group 780 
Table 4. Percentages of subjects not experiencing the illusion in each group, namely participants 781 
whose mean score on subjective ratings was lower than 4. 782 
Group Synchronous Asynchronous Light See-touch Feel-touch 
Controls 28 47 46 61 60 
Sensory-localised 14 18 23 41 64 
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General affective 11 74 58 42 47 
 783 
Table 5. Percentages of subjects not experiencing the illusion for each subscale of each condition.  784 
  Syn   Asyn   Light   See   Feel  
Group Own Loc Age Own  Loc Age Own Loc Age Own Loc Age Own Loc Age 
C 
47 56 65 84 81 84 77 82 81 84 82 86 81 84 86 
S/L 
27 27 41 68 73 68 50 55 68 73 68 77 73 73 73 
A/G 
32 32 63 89 79 100 68 63 84 79 74 89 84 79 95 
 785 
 786 
 787 
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